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Abstract: 
This article mobilizes and integrates both existing and new time series data on 
real wages, physical heights and age-heaping to examine the long-term trend of 
living standards and human capital for China during the eighteenth to twentieth 
centuries.  Our findings confirm the existence of a substantial gap in living 
standards between China and North-western Europe in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. They also reveal a sustained decline in living standards 
and human capital at least in South China from the mid-nineteenth century 
followed by a recovery in the early twentieth century.  However, comparative 
examination of age-heaping data shows that the level of Chinese human capital 
was relatively high by world standard during this period.  We make a preliminary 
exploration of the historical implication of our findings.  
 
 
One prominent feature that underpins the phenomenal catch-up of 
East Asia from very low levels of per capita incomes after World War II is 
the rapid accumulation of physical and human capital.  Godo and Hayami 
(2002) compiled data on average years of schooling to show that the 
Japanese catch-up in average years of schooling preceded that of per 
capita income relative to the US in the pre-War period. Unfortunately, 
works with such a long-term perspective are relatively scarce given the 
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paucity of systematic and comparable data, especially for China.1  
Similarly, despite the voluminous literature on China’s long and 
tumultuous nineteenth century, which saw social and economic 
dislocation from the onslaught of Western imperialism and the 
devastating domestic rebellions, quantitative indications of a systematic 
kind are sorely lacking for long-term trend in welfare and living standards. 
Our paper represents the first attempt to construct a more 
comprehensive profile of the evolution of Chinese living standards and 
human capital in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries based on the 
integration of large-sample based real-wage and anthropometric 
evidences.  Our data series confirm a general decline in living standards 
and human capital after the mid-nineteenth century followed by a 
recovery only at the turn of the century.  Our real wage data also reveal 
Chinese living standards were probably closer to the relatively backward 
parts of Europe but lower than North-western Europe in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. So contrary to recent revisionism (Pomeranz 
2000, Lee et al. 2002), our studies confirm the traditional view that the 
divergence in living standards and per capita incomes between Europe 
and China already existed before the industrial revolution and only 
widened from the nineteenth century and afterward. However, in contrast 
to the findings based on real wages and heights, our age heaping index – 
a measure of Chinese numerical abilities – reveals a relatively high level 
Chinese human capital, which was closer to that of North-western Europe 
for eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than countries with a comparable 
low level of living standards.  
                                                 
1 Godo (2006) extended the average years of schooling data to colonial Taiwan and 
Korea. For physical capital accumulation in East Asia, see the controversial summary 
article by Paul Krugman (1994). For a summary of the East Asian path of labour-
intensive industrialisation based on quality human capital formed in the traditional 
sector, see Sugihara (2007), “The Second Noel Butlin Lecture.” 
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We explore the historical implication of this intriguing combination 
of relatively low living standards but high human capital in China at the 
time.  The concluding section makes some preliminary discussion on the 
unique institutional features in traditional China, such as the Civil-Service 
Examination, a unified character-based language and a precocious 
government bureaucracy, as factors that contributed to relatively higher 
level of literacy and numeracy without necessarily generating sustained 
economic growth to support a higher living standard in the early modern 
era.  We posit that this large reservoir of human capital in early modern 
China and East Asia formed important strategic factors to underpin the 
region’s rapid economic catch-up in the modern era once the institutional 
and ideological changes were accomplished.  
The rest of the paper is divided into three sections to discuss the 
findings derived from real wage, heights and age-heaping, followed by a 
concluding section.  
 
 
1. Real Wages 
 In the debate on the comparative standard of living of Asians and 
Europeans on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, a recent wave of 
revisionist scholarship has claimed Asian living standards were on a par 
with those of Europe in the eighteenth century. However, the evidence 
brought to this debate is fragile, using indirect comparison of scattered 
output, consumption or demographic data.  This contrasts with our 
knowledge of real incomes in Europe where scholars since the mid-
nineteenth century have been compiling databases of wages and prices 
for European cities from the late Middle Ages into the nineteenth century 
when official statistics begin. 2 
                                                 
2 See Allen et al. 2007 for a review of the data issues and Ma 2004 for a general review 
of the revisionist scholarship. 
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The ideal measure for comparison would be per capita GDP, which 
has the advantage of being the most acceptable measure of the overall 
economy and productive capacity, despite the long-held caveats that it 
was not able to capture non-market income often crucially important for 
developing economies, and distributional dimensions. Unfortunately, 
there are no meaningful GDP series for China before the twentieth 
century.3  The influential estimates by Maddison are largely guess-work 
based on backward projection from twentieth century estimates.  While 
highly questionable, they might still be useful as a guide for rough 
comparisons across benchmarks, but they give little indication of 
fluctuations between the benchmarks.     
Recent studies by Allen, Bassino, Ma, Moll-Murata and van Zanden 
(2007) represent the most ambitious attempt to use real wages to fill this 
gap for China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The wage 
series in these studies are constructed from data obtained from Chinese 
imperial ministry records, merchant account books and local gazetteers, 
which have been deflated using an appropriate cost of living indices 
reconstructed from consumption baskets. The Allen et al. paper 
concentrates on the wage histories of Canton (south China), Beijing 
(north China), and Suzhou and Shanghai in the lower Yangzi (east 
China), because they are comparable to the large cities in Europe and 
Japan for which we have similar information.  
While the Allen et al. study is the most comprehensive so far in 
terms of data coverage and methodology, their comparison concentrates 
only on the real wage of urban unskilled workers in major cities of Europe 
and China.  This raises questions of the representativeness and 
comparability of their findings.4  Despite these qualifications, which were 
                                                 
3 See Fukao, Ma and Yuan 2007 for a review of GDP data in East Asian.  
4 One obvious question is the representativeness of the largest and fastest growing 
cities in Europe. Allen (2001) has shown that in smaller English cities such as Oxford, 
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extensively discussed in the Allen et al. paper, we have reason to believe 
their finding represent a better approximation of the relative levels of real 
income at the two ends of Eurasia for the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries than any available alternative estimates. Clearly, future 
research is needed to produce more definitive findings in this area. Figure 
1 reproduces one of their real wage comparisons, which paint a less 
optimistic picture of Chinese or Asian performance than the revisionists 
suggest. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Figure 1 confirms the traditional view that the divergence in living 
standards between major urban centres of China and those of the 
Netherlands and England was already present in the eighteenth century. 
The standard of living of workers in London and Amsterdam was much 
higher than that of workers in Beijing or Suzhou in the eighteenth century. 
But a major surprise is that unskilled labourers in major cities of China – 
poor as they maybe – had roughly the same standard of living as their 
counterparts in central and southern Europe, the Ottoman Empire, India, 
and Japan for the larger part of the eighteenth century.5  
Secondly, from the mid-nineteenth century, real wages in the 
industrial core of Western Europe such as Leipzig began to overtake 
those of China. In contrast, Milan remained at a similarly low level as 
China during this period. By the twentieth century, enough progress had 
occurred in even the backward parts of Europe (as shown in Milan) and 
Japan that their standards of living were beginning to creep above those 
                                                                                                                                               
real wages were much lower than those in London, but they were still higher than in 
China (also see Bassino and Ma 2005). 
5 See Allen et al. 2007, figure 6 for other Asian cities. As their paper finds no major 
differences in levels of real wages among the three cities of Beijing, Canton and 
Suzhou/Shanghai, the real wage series for Canton is omitted in figure 1.  
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in China, while London increased the lead over Beijing. This is what we 
term as the second divergence in the modern era.  
Thirdly, and most relevant for our perspective, is the trend in the 
real wage series for Beijing (Figure 1). This series is composed of three 
series linked together: the first one for the eighteenth century based on 
the average of large number of scattered wage information; the second 
series based on Sidney Gamble (1943), which runs from 1807 to 1903, 
and the third series is for 1900-1925 from Meng and Gamble (1926). 
Among these series, the Gamble (1943) series most importantly spans 
the entire nineteenth century. As seen in Figure 1, it points to a clear and 
sharp drop in real wages during the mid-nineteenth century, a period 
known for the severe economic dislocation caused by Taiping Rebellion 
that devastated large swathes of southern and eastern China. 
 
 
2.  Heights  
Historical data on heights have long been an important 
complementary measure of living standard (Fogel, 1994; Komlos, 1994; 
Steckel, 1995, 2009; Komlos and Baten, 1998; Komlos and Cuff, 1998).  
While heights do not measure the purchasing power aspect of living 
standard, they are better at capturing the ‘biological’ component of 
welfare such as health, life expectancy and the quality of nutrition.  
Compared with GDP, height is particularly sensitive to the economic 
inequalities and the welfare development of the lower income strata, 
which corresponds more closely to the groups of unskilled workers in the 
real wage study.6 
                                                 
6 Height is closely correlated with income; the poorer strata of a population on average 
are shorter than those in the better off strata. In a low income economy, an increase in 
income will raise average height, other things being equal. Average height will also 
increase if income distribution improves such that the lower income strata are better 
able to acquire the inputs necessary for human growth. Conversely, where inequality 
 6
Care needs to be taken about interpretation of heights in 
international comparison due to differences in intergenerational height 
transmission and nutritional habits, which might not be directly related to 
economic scarcities, at least in the short run.  For example, the Dutch and 
Scandinavians today still consume far more milk than Southern Italians 
and Japanese, possibly a legacy of economic scarcity of the past.7  Even 
within China, there exist regional differences with Northerners far taller 
than people in the South.  Nonetheless, with rapidly changing nutritional 
and economic conditions, there has been a narrowing of regional 
differences in heights as well as a convergence of Chinese heights to the 
European and North American level more recently.8  
For this research, we mobilize several large data sets of heights of 
Chinese who migrated from South China to the United States, Australia 
and Indonesia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or who 
worked in modern organisations in China.  We believe that the reported 
height trend and - with certain qualifications - their levels during the 
nineteenth-twentieth century is likely to be a robust long-term indicator for 
nutritional quality and ceteris paribus the living standards at least for the 
southern Chinese.  Below we explain our data sets in six different 
categories. 
                                                                                                                                               
worsens average height might decline even in the presence of increasing GDP. See 
Steckel, 1995. 
7Lactose intolerance, the inability to drink milk without diarrhoea, may have played a 
role in genetically predisposing some populations to shorter stature.  East Asians, 
Native Americans and some African people suffer from lactose intolerance (see Mace 
et al. 2003).  
8 In the early twentieth century the difference between north and south China was in 
the order of 6cm, compared with about 3cm in 2000 for populations of roughly the 
same socioeconomic status (Morgan, 2009, Table 7). Also, contemporary educated 
young male adults in Beijing are not much shorter than white American males. The 
average height of the birth cohort of 1978-81 in urban Northern China was 173.0 cm 
(ranged from 171.2 to 175.8 cm) for the pooled ages age 19-22 years, which is only 2.2 
cm shorter than the United States average in the 1980s (175.8 cm); Beijing urban 
males were 175.5cm on average (China, Ministry of Education, 2002). Large-scale 
anthropometric surveys of children 7-22 years have been conducted in China since the 
late 1970s about every five years. Analysis of the 1979 to 1995 surveys and survey 
methodologies is reported in Morgan, 2000.  
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1. Immigrants to Indonesia. Baten and Hira (2008) made use of a 
large data set of Chinese migrants to Indonesia originally 
measured by the anthropologist Bernhard Hagen in the 1880s.  
Most of the observations were made in 1885 and 1886, with some 
perhaps in 1887.9  The occupations of the Chinese were described 
as “mainly agricultural.”  Fortunately, Hagen reported the ages so 
that the approximate birth years can be calculated.  Overall, Hagen 
measured no less than 15,722 Chinese males who had migrated to 
Indonesia. Our data set made use of !The Formula Not In Table 
subjects, aged from 23 to 50 years. We discarded all those above 
50 and below 23 years of age to exclude the effects of residual 
growth in our data set.  We also collected a much smaller data set 
of migrants to Suriname (159 cases) for the birth-cohort of 1830-34 
to 1845-49. As explained later, they reveal similar height features 
to migrants to Indonesia.    
2. Prisoners in the United States. Carson (2006) collected a sample 
of 1,472 Chinese male immigrant workers who were incarcerated 
in the United States mostly for petty crimes.  
3. Prisoners in Australia. Morgan (2009) has compiled a data set of 
1,492 Chinese imprisoned in Australia between the 1850s and 
1920s, who were from South China and who were mostly born 
between the 1810s and 1880s. Many arrived during the “Gold 
Rush” period of the 1850s.  When the alluvial gold petered out, 
those who remained in Australia mostly turned to rural occupations 
and were generally in a lower socioeconomic group to Chinese 
migrants who arrived from the 1880s.  
                                                 
9 Murray (1994) found a citation to the study in another anthropological study of the 
1920s, and we were able to locate the original text (in German) at the University Library 
Hamburg. 
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4. Migrants to Australia. In the later decades of the nineteenth 
century another wave of Chinese migrants, also mainly from South 
China, arrived in Australia.  Somewhat different from the prisoners’ 
sample, they included many small merchants, market gardeners 
and tradesmen who went to destinations such as Melbourne and 
Sydney (Morgan, 2006a). Those who settled in northern Australia, 
such as Queensland or the Northern Territory, were engaged in 
mining and agriculture and they were more typical of the earlier 
gold-rush period migrants; they were also shorter than those 
residing in Melbourne or Sydney. The current dataset numbers 
3,692 subjects.10  
5. Migrants to the US. From the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) archive of the Pacific Region, we obtained 
a small data set of heights (N=360) from the ship lists of Chinese 
migrants to the US or returning to China. Moreover, this archive 
also holds the National Archives microfilm publications of 
passenger manifests for ships arriving at San Francisco, 1893-
1957. The manifests list the height and age of each passenger 
from 1907 to 1948, and the same is true for most of the 
immigration files.  
6. Employees of Government Organisations in China. The last data 
set discussed comes from government enterprises and agencies, 
who measured their employees in the 1930s and 1940s as part of 
a medical examination system. Most of them were born between 
the 1890s and the 1920s, with some teenagers from the early 
1930s (Morgan, 2004). The largest group was railway workers, but 
                                                 
10 The data are from the National Archives of Australia (NAA) series B13/0, B78/1, 
J2482, and E752/0, which comprise ‘Certificate Exempting from Dictation Test’ (CEDT) 
and a ‘Statutory Declaration’ for Chinese resident in Australia after 1901 who wish to 
leave Australia and return. Detailed description of these series can be obtained from 
the NAA online search facility at www.naa.gov.au and the use of the Australian 
immigration records for anthropometric research is discussed in Morgan, 2006b.  
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there were also employees of government, financial or other 
institutions.  
 
The region of birth is relatively homogenous: the south, and the 
province Guangdong in particular.11  Only in the case of the government 
employees (sample 6) was the regional spread larger, but we took care to 
extract a series – unskilled railway workers from South China. We can 
therefore assume that the estimates approximate trends in Southern 
China. 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 gives a plot of the trend level of different time series of 
Chinese heights as described in the sample.  Two features stand out.  
Firstly, the shortest Chinese were those who went to Indonesia as 
contract worker as well as those that went to Suriname.12 The heights of 
prisoners in both Australia and the United States were the second 
shortest.  Clearly, among the tallest are the migrants to the US and 
Australia.  Interestingly, migrants to the Australian Northern territory were 
shorter than those that resided in Melbourne and Queensland.  Finally, 
the railroad employee data set for South China had a slightly higher value 
in the 1890s, but only by about half a centimetre.   
We believe the observed differences in our samples seem a 
reasonable reflection of the selectivity biases among the migrants who 
comprise the samples used here.  It is likely that those who went to more 
                                                 
11 All measured Chinese immigrants were reported to have come from the South 
(usually Canton) or simply “China.”  Our statistical t-test reveals that the differences in 
mean heights for migrants identified as Canton or another place in South China and 
“China” groups as indistinguishable at the 1 per cent level. For the predominance of 
Guangdong and Fujian origin of overseas Chinese migrants in the nineteenth century, 
see Ge, Hou and Zhang 1999, pp. 191-201.  
12 The Surinam sample not shown in the figure confirms a similar height levels with a 
clear downward trend from the 1840s, see Baten and Hira 2008.   
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attractive locations had to incur higher costs of migration and thus might 
have been slightly positively selected. This might have been the case for 
Chinese migrants to the United States and Australia, many of whom 
funded their passage through debts securitised against property or other 
family assets (summarised in Morgan, 2009). Finally, the relatively high 
value of the unskilled railroad workers in South China can be explained 
by the fact that these government employees were often regarded as a 
kind of elite workers with literacy level higher than the average working 
population (Morgan, 2004).   
Secondly, despite this heterogeneity, we can discern clearly a 
broad common trend among these different series.  While the height trend 
seems to have been stable up until the 1830-40s, all series started to 
decline from the mid-nineteenth century, which coincided with the 
devastating Taiping rebellion.  Moreover, an unexpected finding is that 
most of the series, following what seems like a stagnation – at best a mild 
recovery – in heights during the 1860s and 1870s, reverts back into a 
fairly substantial and sustained decline all the way into the 1880s and 
even 1890s. This decline seems to have bottomed out towards the turn of 
the last century with a rebound and recovery in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century.  The co-movement of these series is remarkably 
consistent.   
We believe that systematic selection biases in any one direction are 
less likely as our data sets consist of large numbers of South Chinese 
migrants who went to different locations in both developed and 
developing regions with varying entry dates and measured by different 
authorise.13  We also make a cross-check against the only independent 
height series for non-overseas migrant available during the nineteenth 
century: Chinese residents (largely of Cantonese and Fujianese origin) in 
                                                 
13 See figure 8 in Morgan 2006a for the year of arrival for some of Chinese immigrants 
in Australia.  
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Taiwan still under Qing rule (Kelly Olds 2003). Measured by Japanese 
colonial authority in the early twentieth century, the height trend for male 
and female reveal nearly identical patterns of decline from mid-nineteenth 
century, followed a stagnation during the 1860s and 1870s and a 
renewed and sustained decline in the 1880s and 1890s.14   
In Figure 3, we summarize these disparate sample series into a 
single continuous but notional series that we believe as representative of 
the height trend of the lower and working class Southern Chinese male in 
1810-1920, but with sufficient human capital and wealth to move to 
Australia. The series splices together the Australia prisoner series for 
1810 to 1840 with the migrant series estimated for migrants in the 
Northern Territory, whose occupation backgrounds is similar to the 
prisoners, and the gap 1840-50 is filled by simple linear interpolation.15 
We also plot this trend line against other height series for international 
comparison.  These series were adult males of broadly comparable social 
class to our Southern Chinese series and regionally representative for 
their country population as a whole (see Baten 2006).  
Figure 3 clearly indicates that the northern Europeans 
(Netherlands) were taller and became even taller after the mid-century. 
The southern Europeans (Italy) were shorter than the Chinese with little 
upward movement in stature until the 1860s, after which their heights 
began to rise above the Southern Chinese.  Figure 3 thus confirms the 
so-called second divergence where both Dutch and Italian heights 
starting an upward trend from the mid-nineteenth century following rapid 
industrialization, while Chinese height stagnated or declined thereafter.16  
                                                 
14 See Kelly 2003, figures 2 and 3, which are partly reproduced later in figure 3 in this 
article.  
15 The original series were estimated in decal units. Linear interpolation between the 
decal mid-points have been used to create a five-year series.  
16 We can place our Southern Chinese height data in a larger sample of the heights in 
all European countries. An appendix to Baten (2006) presents the height estimates for 
all European countries with 500,000 and more inhabitants for the birth cohorts 1850, 
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Insert Figure 3 here 
 
Perhaps more interesting is that the Southern Chinese seemed to 
perform poorly in the East Asian context.  As shown in the data, although 
the Japanese started as unusually short, they managed to grow at a rate 
of about 1.0 cm a decade from the late nineteenth century. More 
strikingly, heights of Chinese in Taiwan (largely of South China origin) are 
almost non-distinguishable both in trend and level during the nineteenth 
century but grew rapidly from the early decades of Japanese colonialism 
from the beginning of the twentieth century (Olds, 2003; Morgan and Liu, 
2007). Overall, we see a case of China lagging behind the better 
performers during the nineteenth-twentieth centuries.17  
 
 
3.  Age-Heaping 
Recently, new research based on the use of age-heaping 
measurement has made it possible to quantify numeracy in comparative 
and long-term perspectives. This line of research was pioneered by 
Mokyr (1983) in the modern economic history context, and by Duncan-
Jones (1990) for the study of ancient economies (after some earlier 
                                                                                                                                               
1890, and 1920 (available from 
http://www.wiwi.unituebingen.de/cms/fileadmin/Uploads/Schulung/Schulung5/Paper/eu
rohgt.pdf accessed May 7th, 2009). In 1850, the Southern Chinese height of around 
164 cm, is shorter than the average height of 168-169 cm in those European countries 
with tall inhabitants (Scandinavia, Ireland, some parts of later Yugoslavia) but 
surpasses the 160-162 cm average attained in those countries with short populations 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy).  Overall, seven out of 36 countries or about one fifth of 
European countries had lower heights than those of Southern China. By 1890, 
however, all European countries except Portugal had shorter heights than Southern 
China, and by 1920, Southern China stood at the bottom of the European height 
distribution. 
17 The unusually short level of Japanese heights in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries has been much noted and may be associated with a lack of protein in a 
largely vegetarian diet during the Tokugawa era when Japan was extremely isolated. 
Here our comparative analysis focuses on its trend only which is unequivocally from 
the 1880s.   
 13
demographic studies, see Bachi 1951). But only recently, Crayen and 
Baten (2008) have compiled large international data sets that allow global 
comparisons. The age-heaping strategy is based on the tendency of 
poorly educated people in the past to round their age. For example, when 
asked their age they answer more often “40”, when their actual age may 
in fact be 39 or 41 years. Conversely, better educated people are more 
likely to report their exact age.  The age heaping index (also  
called a Whipple index) is a measure of the concentration or degree of 
age heaping between 23 and 62 years inclusive and is represented as 
follows:  
 
 100*   
5 aor  0 
ages all ofnumber 
ain  ending ages ofnumber *5WI =
 
Therefore, an index equal to 100 indicates the absence of age-heaping 
and magnitude of the index being above 100 indicates the degree of age-
heaping.  
A wide range of research has confirmed a strong relationship 
between illiteracy and age heaping especially for Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) after 1950.  For example, a correlation coefficient of 
0.63 has been found for a sample of about 270,000 individuals, organized 
by 416 regions, ranging from Latin America to Oceania. The data from the 
PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) results for 
numerical skills yielded an even higher correlation coefficient (A’Hearn, 
Baten, Crayen 2009, Appendix). This correlation has also been confirmed 
for the nineteenth century data (A’Hearn, Baten, Crayen 2009; Crayen 
and Baten, 2008).  Age-heaping index reflects numerical skills even more 
than literacy skills, which could be more important for technical, 
commercial and craftsmen activities than literacy. 
The appeal of age heaping methods is the ready availability of age-
information for countries such as China where systematic sources of 
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historical numeracy or literacy information are largely absent. Before we 
present our findings, it is important to clarify some specific issues related 
to the use of age-heaping measures in the context of traditional China.  
We perform a test to examine the linkage between literacy and numeracy 
using an exceptional sample of Chinese migrants in the US, which 
provide not only age information but also literacy (which includes both 
Chinese as well as English reading and writing skills) and occupational 
categories.  This is a data set of 2,435 Chinese males in the United 
States, 220 of which were US born.  The data, extracted from the 
Individual Public Use Microdata Set (IPUMS) data set of 1850-1910, are a 
representative sample based on the US censuses. We exclude the 
females (their number was too small for reliable analysis) before 
calculating age heaping for those of the birth decades of the 1830s – 
1880s.  
For our purpose, we use the standard occupational classification 
used by the US Census to create nine categories for the 2,435 Chinese 
immigrants between 23 and 72.  The occupations ranged from income 
level of 600 dollars per year in 1950 prices (group 1) to between 1,500 
and 2,000 (group 5), and to more than 2,500 (group 9). The distribution of 
incomes was not linear, and some occupation accounted for a large share 
of the Chinese population, so we took care that sufficient numbers of 
observations fell in each group.  
Figure 4 reveals a high negative relationship (with a correlation 
coefficient of -0.8) between literacy rates and Whipple Index for these 
nine occupation categories.18  More interestingly, this correlation seems 
                                                 
18 Without using the classification of occupational categories, we can also confirm this 
negative relationship with a logit regression which regresses a dummy variable of 
people who reported their ages in the multiples of 0s and 5s on a dummy variable of 
literacy. Our result shows that people who reported ages in 0s and 5s are 3% less 
likely to be literate than those who did not, which is statistical significant at 10% level. 
The small marginal effects (3%) are expected given that this is a fairly literate sample 
and that not all people who reported their ages in round numbers are illiterate and.    
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actually tighter than the correspondence between income categories and 
literacy rates.  While the higher income groups 7 to 9 has the highest 
literacy rate, and the poorest group 1 has the lowest rate, occupation 
categories 4 (mainly launderers) and 8 (mainly miners) or group 2 
(domestic servants) in fact have similar levels of literacy rates.  Thus, we 
are reasonably assured that age-heaping index is good predicator for 
literacy rates and human capital in China.19  
 
Insert Figure 4 
 
Below we describe six different data sets for our age-heaping 
series:   
1. The Qing archives of the Imperial Board of Punishment contain a 
record of criminal cases of Chinese farmers and peasants involved 
in various property crimes, rental conflicts, usury or domestic 
conflicts during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
The court files as published covered a large number of Chinese 
regions. Overall, we have 602 reported ages between 23 and 72, 
which allows some point estimates for the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century.20 
2. The data file for immigrants to Indonesia is the same as those for 
the height series. 
                                                 
19  We also checked whether the Chinese use of animal cycles for their birth years may 
lead to age-heaping of a different sort rather than on multiples of 5s or 0s.  We checked 
the age-heaping around the dragon year of birth – the most popular and auspicious 
animal sign for a birth year – for Chinese migrants to the US and found they were far 
less marked than heaping on multiples of 5s. 
20 The censorial section of the board of punishment (Xingke tiben) is an important 
archival source for a number of reasons, not only the age statements. The memorial 
documents contain information on land prices, land rents, interest rates (‘usury’), 
among other personal and household data, covering all Chinese administrative regions. 
A small part of these memorials, especially from the Qianlong period (1735-95) have 
been published (Historical Archive No. 1 1981). Allen et al. 2007 also made use of 
wage information from these sources. Ages we used in those sources only include self-
reported ones by “criminals” still living at the time.  
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3. We collected a smaller data set of 193 Beijing Chinese soldiers 
born in mid-nineteenth century. Although small in sample size, this 
data set is particularly valuable as other nineteenth century data 
consisted mostly of overseas migrants.  The sources are from the 
Qing archive and consisted of soldier lists from the Chinese army 
(partially Manchu), which were taken by Chinese officers between 
1902 and 1911.21  
4. Two data series for Chinese immigrants to Australia are used to 
estimate age heaping. The first is the same as the height series 
discussed above for migrants to Melbourne, Brisbane and Darwin. 
The second series is a recently compiled dataset of 8209 southern 
Chinese immigrants who lived in Sydney or elsewhere in the state 
of New South Wales in Australia located in ST84/1 series at the 
NAA, Sydney Office. This series has only been used to estimate 
age heaping and is independent of the first series used to report 
heights.22  
5. The data set of 2,435 Chinese males in the United States as 
described earlier.  
6. We use the first Chinese nationwide census undertaken in 1953 to 
calculate whipple index for those born in the 1900s and 1910s, in 
order to complement the eighteenth and nineteenth century data 
with an endpoint in the early twentieth century. 
                                                 
21 The No.1 Historical Archive, Beijing, Shuntian Fu archive, microfilm reel no. 254. We 
thank Hans-Ulrich Vogel for helping with the access to this valuable source. 
22 The Sydney ST84/1 series only contains the CEDT (also known as a Form 21) and 
does not include the Statutory Declaration (Form 22), which shows data related to 
occupations, residences, and other information useful for analysing height trend.  
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Figure 5 plots the Whipple indices of the different data series.23 The 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth century data from the Board of 
Punishment files reveal a rather modest level of age-heaping of about 
110.  It is important to note that most European countries reached such a 
low level not before the late eighteenth century, whereas the early 
eighteenth century levels of France and Germany were much higher (in 
the range of 160-220).24  We do not have data for the period between the 
early eighteenth century and the 1820s.  But for series starting from the 
1820s, the picture that emerged in figure 5 is that for almost all series of 
age-heaping indices as organized by birth-decades rose and peaked 
around the 1840s, with that of the US migrants rising to as high as 170-
190.25  A similar spike in age-heaping is also confirmed for the Beijing 
soldiers in the period 1840-60, with a value at 150.  But from the 1860s 
(birth cohorts) onward, figure 5 reveals a huge improvement in age-
heaping almost across all the data series.26  By the early twentieth 
                                                 
23 For calculating age-heaping, we aggregate all age statements into the age groups 
such as 23-32, 33-42, and 53-62, and denote those born mostly in the 1850s as “1850” 
in the graph (even if this sometimes refers to those born actually 1847-56). This 
methodology is common in the age heaping literature to ensure that age heaping is 
estimated more conservatively than the obvious alternative to estimate age brackets 
20-29, 30-39, 50-59 and so on. The problem with the alternative method is a strong 
age-heaping on, for example, age 50, in societies with low life expectancies leaving 
fewer survivors past age 53.  Similarly, there will be more survivors at age 55 rather 
than age 59. Thus, taking age brackets 23-32 etc places the most strongly preferred 
age 30 and 25 to the middle of the distribution, hence minimizing this bias.  
24 We also located a very small data set of about 50 seamen who found shelter in 
Japan during a storm. Their Whipple Index turned out to be as high as 213. The 
sample size is too small to be meaningfully included here. But it is plausible that levels 
of literacy and numeracy were very low among the class of seamen or pirates who 
were usually social outcasts barred, for example, from taking part in the Civil-Service 
Examination system, see Wakemen Jr. 1966, chapter 1. Data on Chinese seamen are 
from Ryūkyū ōkoku hyōjōsho monjo henshū iinkai, 1988. 
25 For the US migrant sample, age is relatively constant at 30-36 (except for the middle 
cohort of those born in the 1860s, with an average age of 41), so we believe that our 
result is not biased by possible differences in the age composition of the various 
samples.  
26 Although not sufficient in numbers, we also calculated the level of United States born 
Chinese for the 1870s and 1880s. Interestingly, their age heaping is not lower than 
those Chinese born, but rather higher, with values of 167 of those born in the 1870s, 
and 136 in the 1880s. 
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century, age-heaping seems to have largely disappeared based on the 
National census data of the 1950s.27  
Insert Figure 5 
Figure 6 organizes the various age heaping measures for China 
into one single notional series to cast it in international context.  Taking an 
average of the Chinese age heaping values reported above yields values 
around 150 during the 1820s, rising to 170 during the mid-century crisis 
period, and declining afterwards until full age numeracy is reached among 
the birth cohort of the 1890s (with a Whipple Index of 100).  Despite the 
mid-nineteenth century surge, the Chinese degree of age numeracy thus 
measured were impressive by international comparison, being among the 
highest in the world along with Western and Eastern Europe in the 
nineteenth century (also see Crayen and Baten 2008).  In fact, we could 
make a general case for East Asia.  The earliest source on Japanese 
age-heaping in 1879 (published 1882 for the region which is now 
Yamanashi) that could be located so far did not show any age-heaping for 
the birth cohorts of the early nineteenth century, nor did the Taiwan list 
from 1905, taken by the Japanese colonial government.28  Figure 6 
shows that while UK and France were achieving better values already
the early nineteenth century, Poland, Russia (European part) and Irela
were actually doing worse than China with India or Turkey (with per capita 
income possibly comparable to that of China) faring far worse.   
 in 
nd 
                                                
 
Insert Figure 6 here 
 
27 We also calculated Whipple Index for the data series of the railway and other modern 
organisations for the early twentieth century and also confirmed that there was no age-
heaping. This is not surprising given that the average literacy level for the Chinese 
national railways was about 70%, and 100% for the professional staff. More importantly, 
as these data also recorded birth dates and years, making the calculation of age-
heaping index highly problematic.  
28 We thank Osamu Saito for providing those lists on Japan and Taiwan. 
 19
The anthropometric and real wage evidences presented in this 
article now allow us to piece together a quantitative profile of Chinese 
welfare and human capital for the eighteenth to twentieth centuries when 
historical evidences presented so far have been descriptive, indirect and 
scattered.  Our findings confirm and revise traditional historiography as 
well as reveal new insights.  
Firstly, our study quantitatively confirms the large and sustained 
decline in living standards and human capital during the mid-nineteenth 
century, an era of political and economic crises brought by the Opium 
War and the devastating Taiping Rebellion.  The Taiping rebels originated 
in the southern province of Guangxi in 1850 and spread north into east 
China and beyond.  By the time of their military defeat in 1864, the entire 
rebellion and its suppression led to a halving of the population of the 
lower Yangzi provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang and possibly 30 million 
deaths nationwide. For Guangdong province and the city of Canton, the 
rebellion of Red Turbans associated with Taiping movement caused 
large-scale destruction of lives and properties during the mid-1850s 
(Spence 1999 and Wakeman, 1966).  Our data reveals the severe 
negative impact of mid-nineteenth century crisis on the 1840s Chinese 
birth-cohort’s capacity to acquire numerical and literacy skills possibly due 
to malnutrition and breakdown of social order and traditional school 
system during their formative decades of the 1850s and 1860s.  Such an 
experience is not peculiar to China as witnessed by the surge in age-
heaping among the Irish inflicted by the famine crisis of the 1840s and 
also for Spain on a milder scale (Manzel, 2008).   
Secondly, the different patterns of the three data series as revealed 
in our study contribute new historical insights.  Among the three series, 
real wage and age-heaping indices bounced back from the 1860s, but the 
fall in height trend seems to have sustained throughout the latter half of 
the nineteenth century.  The rapid recovery of the first two series seems 
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to confirm the traditional historiography that emphasized the relative 
success of the so-called 1862-1874 Tong-Zhi restoration in returning the 
post-Taiping China to peace and normalcy (Wright, 1962).  A hallmark of 
the Restoration was the rejuvenation of traditional governmental 
bureaucracy as severely compromised by the massive sale of official 
titles in the war era for revenue purpose and reinstatement of the 
millennium-old national Civil Service Examination system as suspended 
during the War era (Wright, 1962, chapter 5).  It is likely that these 
policies have restructured incentives for human capital accumulation and 
contributed to the drastic improvement in age-heaping indices. 
The somewhat surprising finding of a sustained decline in heights 
into the 1880s and 1890s seems to stand in contrast to the rapid recovery 
of age-heaping (and the real wage series) in the post-Taiping Rebellion 
era.  While it is plausible this decline may be more region-specific to 
South China (including Taiwan) with Canton losing her eminent trading 
port status to Shanghai or other treaty ports in the post-Opium War era, 
we believe that our empirical finding merits serious future academic 
research, which may well lead to a more pessimistic profile of living 
standards during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 29 In fact, 
despite the high-profile attempts to modernize her military and other 
limited industrial sectors, the general outlook and policy of Qing under the 
so-called late nineteenth century self-strengthening movement remained 
conservative, especially in contrast to contemporaneous Meiji Japan.  Not 
only did they resist any fundamental institutional reform, but also 
obstructed the construction of modern infrastructures such as railroads. 
Modern public infrastructures constructed mostly after the twentieth 
century, as emphasized recently by Ge, Hou and Zhang (1999), would 
                                                 
29 For regional differences in height trend in the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, see Morgan 2004).   
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have allowed effective relief efforts to avert the kind of massive human 
and material losses incurred by disaster and famine in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century.30  In this context, the recovery in heights from the 
beginning of the twentieth century – an era marked by the imminent 
dynastic collapse and national disintegration – does not come as total 
surprise.  Recent scholarship has emphatically shown that the first three 
decades of the twentieth century – despite the political and civil strife – 
were marked by the onset of a region-based spurt of industrialization and 
modernization (Rawski 1989, Ma 2008).  
 
 
4. Conclusion: Towards an Integrated Narrative of Living 
Standards and Human Capital 
By placing our new time series data in an international context, our 
article reveals a rather intriguing combination of relatively low living 
standards with high human capital in traditional China.  While our finding 
of a relatively low standard of living counters the argument of recent 
revisionism, the case for a relatively high level of human capital seems to 
echo other historical studies.  For example, Ronald P. Dore’s landmark 
study in 1965 offered a remarkably optimistic reassessment of Japanese 
                                                 
30 Ge, Hou and Zhang, 1999, noted the importance of modern health facilities and 
public infrastructure in the early twentieth century for disaster and famine relief. For 
wars and disasters occurring during the period of 1870-1890, see Cao 2001, chapters 
13-15, on the prolonged Muslim rebellions in South- and North-western parts of China 
and severe drought leading to famine in five provinces of Northern China in the late 
1870s which claimed tens of millions of lives. Finally, cross-national factors could be at 
work as well: waves of rinderpest (cattle plagues) seemed to have swept across parts 
of Asia and Africa where we observed similar decline in heights in the 1880s and 1890s 
period (Spinage, 2003). Rinderpest was enzootic to hooved animals in China’s central 
plains and the Mongolian steppes. Its presence was first observed in outbreaks in 
Hong Kong and Shanghai in the 1860-70s, and transmitted to Japan through imported 
cattle with epizootic effect, though there were earlier suspected outbreaks (Spinage, 
2003; MacPherson, 1987; Kishi, 1976). A foreign medical missionary described 
rinderpest as having a more debilitating affect on Chinese agriculture than floods and 
drought by depriving them of ox and buffalo for ploughing fields and pumping water, 
which could reduce grain yield (Bliss, 1922, cited in Spinage, 2003).  
 
 22
education in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). The school enrolment 
data in 1868 led him to conclude something like 43% literacy rate for male 
and 19% for girls, a remarkably high level by early modern standards 
(Hayami and Kito, 2004). Other studies have also pointed to the existence 
of a dynamic book publishing industry and book rental market as well as 
near ubiquitous presence of book-keeping and accounting practise 
among business and domestic households, and the widespread use of 
farm manuals (Hayami and Kito, 2004; Smith, 1988).  
Evelyn Rawski’s 1979 study in many ways echoed the Japanese 
assessment for the case of China. Based on admittedly fragmentary and 
circumstantial evidence, Rawski put the basic literacy level of Chinese 
males at 30 to 45% and females at 2 to 10 percent for China as a whole 
(Rawski, 1979, p.22-23). According to her, both opportunities for 
education and schooling had expanded during the Ming (1368-1644) and 
Qing (1648-1911) period. More importantly, education went way beyond 
the elites in preparation for the prestigious civil service examinations and 
spilled over to a wide spectrum of the society to fulfil demand for 
commerce, local administration or even agricultural production (Rawski, 
1979, chapter 1, Li Bozhong, 2003).  In comparison with Japan, Rawski 
argued that “if a stratified, status-fixed society such as Japan’s 
experienced this great demand for basic skills in reading, writing, and 
arithmetic among townsmen and farmers (in the Tokugawa period), a 
relatively open society such as China’s, where education was the key to 
upward social mobility, should have stimulated a similar if not greater 
effective demand for literacy” (p. 5). In other studies, both Rawski (1985) 
and Li (2003) detailed the development of a thriving private and 
commercial publishing industry to satisfy the demand of a large reading 
public forged by the homogeneity of the Chinese written character. Book 
publishing was highly differentiated, from scholarly encyclopaedias, 
histories and philosophical treatises to morality plays, romance novels, 
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Buddhist sutra and primers for all sorts of trades. In addition, cities and 
towns “had an abundance of posted regulations, shops signs, 
advertisements, and other material to read for profit and amusement” 
(Naquin and Rawski, 1987, p.p 58-9) and publishing was further aided by 
the relatively low cost of paper and Chinese style of woodblock printing 
(Rawski, 1985).  
Besides literacy, scholars have also presented direct historical 
evidence of numeracy. Li (2003), in particular, noted the widespread 
diffusion of popular arithmetic textbooks, the spread of abacus, and the 
adoption of various special numerals for book-keeping and accounting 
during the late Ming and Qing. A series of new research have now begun 
to utilize long-ignored surviving account books, which meticulously 
recorded transactions and various summary accounts with sophisticated 
traditional accounting techniques (Gao 1982 and 1988, Gardella, 1992, 
for China; Jun and Lewis, 2006, for Korea). The important role of a lunar 
calendar in daily lives and in fact, the whole numerology and number-
mysticism, for whatever its dubious claim to prediction, predisposed 
Chinese thinking to a numerical framework for scientific inquiry (Ronan 
and Needham, 1978). 
In fact, the combination of high human capital and low income level 
is not merely a historical phenomenon.  Drawing on the results of 
standardized international tests, Hanushek and Woessman (2008) show 
that the average test scores of Chinese students today ranked among the 
top end of those from OECD countries whose per capita income are 
several fold higher than in China.  Further research should explore the 
possible historical root of this relatively high level of human capital 
accumulation, in particular its linkage with long-lasting institutions in 
traditional China, such as a relatively open Civil-Service Examination, a 
unified written character and a precocious government bureaucracy.  The 
rise of an independent small-holding peasantry under this institutional 
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framework turned each household into a self-contained producing and 
marketing unit in direct interaction with both the market and state (for 
taxation).   
It is important to note that these institutional features in traditional 
China had been largely designed for social control and discipline for an 
agrarian empire.  But its unintended legacy - a relatively large reservoir of 
human capital in early modern China and East Asia - may have facilitated 
their rapid economic catch-up of in the modern era once required 
institutional and ideological changes were accomplished.  In fact, the lags 
and differential pace of economic catch-up within East Asia over the past 
two centuries may well be an outcome of the differential timing of the 
institutional and ideological change.  This intricate relationship between 
human capital and institutions for China and East Asia is a confirmation of 
recent theoretical empirical insights as expounded in Glaeser et al. 
(2004). It serves as a fresh reminder that by focusing exclusively on the 
comparison of national income per capita, we may be missing the most 
crucial and essential factor that accounts for both the early modern great 
divergence and the recent convergence between the two ends of Eurasia.   
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Figure 1: Real Wage Trends in China and Europe 
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Source: Allen et al. 2007. 
 33
Figure 2: Trends of Chinese Height Samples by Birth Cohort 
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Source: See text. 
Notes:   
Mig to ID: Migrants to Indonesia;  
Pris US: Chinese prisoners in the United States;  
Pris AU: Chinese Prisoners in Australia; use Pris AU.  
Mig US: Migrants to the United States;  
Sth unskilled rlwy: unskilled railway workers from south China;  
Mig AU-Nth Terr: Migrants to Australia’s Northern Territory 
Mig AU-Melb./Vic.: Migrants to Melbourne/Victoria; delete C&A 
Mig AU-Qld: Migrants to Queensland;  
 
The reported height of the Chinese to Australia for both prisoners and migrants were 
adjusted for age-related shrinkage as explained in Morgan (2009). 
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Figure 3: A Notional Trend of Secular Height of Southern Chinese in 1810s-
1920s in Comparative Perspective 
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Notes: Notes: Italy – calculated from A’Hearn (2003), Netherlands – calculated from 
Drukker and Tassenaar (1997), For Taiwan, 1845-1900 from Olds (2007 Model 2 for 
Male in Table 3. 1900-1930 from Morgan and Liu (2007); South China see text and Fig 
2; Japan is calculated from Bassino (2006) and Shay (1996).  
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Figure 4: Literacy and Age Heaping (Whipple Index) by Nine Different 
Occupational Classes Among Chinese Immigrants to the U.S. 
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Notes: See the text. The sample size for the nine occupational categories (from one to 
nine) is: 178, 153, 239, 268, 202, 415, 158, 627, and 195.  
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Figure 5: Trends of Age Heaping Among a Variety of Chinese Samples by Birth 
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Note: see the text. “Mig. AU-Melb./B/D” were there migrants recorded in the archives of 
Melbourne, Brisbane, and Darwin. Age heaping samples below 50 were discarded.  
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Figure 6: Age heaping in China in international comparison 
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Sources: China is an average from the data reported in the text. The sources for the 
other countries are provided in Crayen and Baten (2008).  
For India, this includes only the part of the country included in the late-nineteenth C 
censuses (age heaping might have been higher for other regions).  
Poland refers to a weighted average of Russian, Habsburg, and Prussian Poland.  
Russia reflects the provinces which form today’s Russia.  
Ireland excludes North Ireland.  
The Turkish values reflect the whole country after the 1880s, and the province of Kars 
before that (which Crayen and Baten 2008 judge as broadly representative for the 
Turkish average).  
We thank Dorothee Crayen for assisting us with relevant data and information.  
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